How Can Haiti Pay for the State It Needs?

What kind of state can $129 per person a year pay for? Using 2024 comparison figures, that was roughly Haiti's annual tax revenue per resident. Police, courts, schools, roads, and public health all make claims on that limited pool. The corresponding figure for the Dominican Republic was about $1,718.

Better collection is essential. But suppose Haiti collected the same share of its economy as its neighbor. Would that close the gap? Not nearly. To finance the institutions Haiti needs, we have to protect more of today's revenue and build a much larger productive economy. Four practical changes could help do both.

Better collection cannot close the gap alone

The calculation starts with roughly $2,143 in GDP per person and a tax-to-GDP ratio of 6 percent for Haiti. Multiply them and the result is about $129. These historical figures establish the scale of the financing problem, not today's budget position.

Now apply the Dominican collection rate of 15.8 percent to Haiti's existing economy. The result is about $339 per person. That is a substantial improvement over $129, but it closes only about 13 percent of the original gap. Better collection matters. It cannot, by itself, make a small economy finance the services of a much larger one.

What if economic output per person grew fivefold? At the same 6 percent collection rate, revenue would reach about $643 per person. Combine that growth with a 15.8 percent rate and it would reach approximately $1,693, close to the Dominican comparison. These are illustrative calculations, holding other factors constant, not a forecast or a timetable.

Haiti needs both a larger economy and better collection. Reducing diversion protects revenue now; expanding production creates a larger base to finance services over time. Neither is a reason to postpone the other. Where can we make practical progress on both?

First, get customs payments into the treasury

Customs is a place where one focused reform can improve public revenue and fair competition. An importer who pays the lawful duty should not be undercut by a competitor with access to a private arrangement. Make the transaction verifiable from valuation to release:

• Check the declared value before shipment through an independent process operating under lawful customs valuation rules.
• Carry that record through digital clearance, with documented reasons for any adjustment.
• Pay duties directly into a protected, auditable public account and reconcile the payment with the goods released.

Why these three together? A reliable valuation is of limited use if it can be quietly changed on arrival. Digital paperwork does little if the payment disappears afterward. Each part closes a different opportunity for diversion.

Haitian customs authorities would retain legal authority. International support could finance systems, training, and independent verification under a published agreement. An importer needs a workable appeal when the valuation is wrong, and operator fees must be visible. A protected account should strengthen public financial control, not create a private treasury beyond it.

Start with a defined set of shipments at an operational port. Compare clearance times, declared values, duties actually received, disputes, and total costs to importers. If revenue rises only because legitimate trade has become prohibitively expensive, we have not solved the problem.

Second, close the route around customs reform

Suppose we improve customs at a Haitian port, but the same importer can avoid the new controls by landing goods in the Dominican Republic and trucking them across an inadequately monitored crossing. What have we accomplished? We may simply have rewarded the business willing to bypass the rules.

For imports legally required to arrive by sea, support direct entry at authorized Haitian seaports and apply the same controls across those ports. The June 2026 Working Group readout describes a 2025 by-sea requirement whose enforcement remained a problem. Confirm its current legal scope and exceptions, then design enforcement around the cargo it actually covers.

This should not become a requirement that every shipment pass through Port-au-Prince. The objective is accountable entry at authorized Haitian seaports, with the capacity to process goods. Nor does it mean treating all commerce across the Dominican border as illicit. Lawful cross-border trade and essential supplies require workable arrangements.

The practical task is to align shipping records, customs declarations, and enforcement for covered cargo with Dominican and international cooperation. Check port capacity, transport costs, food access, and permitted exceptions before tightening enforcement. During a disruption, an alternative authorized route would need equivalent valuation, payment, and audit controls. Otherwise a revenue reform could become a shortage.

The first customs proposal protects the transaction. This second proposal addresses the incentive to avoid it. They need to be designed together.

Third, build electricity around customers who already pay

We usually ask how Haiti can generate more electricity. There is another question worth asking first: who pays for the electricity after it is generated?

If a producer must be paid but the distribution system fails to collect from customers, additional generation can increase the treasury's losses. Under that arrangement, building more capacity is not enough. We need a paying route from the customer back to the producer.

Begin with businesses and institutions already paying heavily for diesel self-generation. Interview estimates compiled for the June 2026 fiscal analysis put that cost at 45 to 50 cents per kilowatt-hour, compared with roughly 20 cents from a producer. That is a reason to investigate, not a quoted saving: network costs, losses, financing, and backup still have to be included in the delivered price.

Could a licensed producer connect a cluster of creditworthy customers through a metered mini-grid, supported by enforceable purchase contracts? Industry, banks, and other large users could provide an initial customer base. Public institutions would qualify only with credible payment arrangements, not simply because they are government buildings.

Private capital could then finance generation against contracted demand, with narrowly defined donor support for preparation or specific risks. Start with independently verified operating costs and customers willing to commit. If the delivered price saves them money and pays for the system, expansion has a commercial foundation.

Neighborhood connections could follow where demand and payment arrangements support them. Access for poorer households would need explicit financing or a targeted subsidy; it should not rest on a promise that the benefits will eventually spread.

A gas-import terminal also deserves consideration as a way to enable lower-cost generation at scale. U.S. support could begin with a feasibility study tied to actual power demand, comparing gas with solar, storage, and other supply options. Fuel security, infrastructure cost, environmental effects, and utilization would determine whether construction merits support. The test is affordable, reliable electricity delivered to customers, not the size of the project.

Fourth, help viable businesses reopen and rehire

If we want jobs relatively quickly, must every investment begin with a new business? What about an operator who already knows the market, knows how to hire, and wants to return but cannot bear another loss from violence?

Offer war-risk insurance and guarantees tied to reopening and rehiring. Begin with firms that have a credible commercial reason to return. Verify what remains of their sites, equipment, workforce, and supply relationships. Some can restart; others will require much more than insurance.

A participating insurer or development-finance institution could assess defined risks and offer bounded coverage. Donors could support premiums or a capped loss-sharing facility where the expected recovery benefit justifies it. Owners would still contribute capital and retain ordinary business risk. Security must be sufficient for the investment to operate; insurance cannot substitute for that.

Keep the distinction between investment support and insurance clear. Release reopening finance against verified expenditures and agreed employment milestones. Pay insurance claims only for the covered losses under the policy. The program is intended to make productive return possible, not to purchase idle assets or compensate every historical loss.

A first group of eligible firms could test the idea. Publish selection criteria, public exposure, money committed, operations restored, and jobs retained. Include smaller Haitian firms able to demonstrate viability, rather than making prior size or political access the price of admission. Track whether businesses remain open after the initial assistance ends.

Put the proposals to work

Each changes a specific constraint. Customs receipts need a protected path. Trade rules need an answer to evasion. Power needs customers whose payments reach producers. Viable businesses need a way to bear risks that otherwise keep them closed. None requires us to assume that a general appeal for better governance will suddenly change everyone's behavior.

The same reasoning applies to spending. Local recovery funds can go to authorized local institutions, with public records linking allocations to payments and completed work. Verified police salaries can go directly to officers' accounts. National revenue reform and decentralized delivery are compatible: collect under national law, allocate through a transparent budget, and verify what the money provides.

This requires a much larger commitment to productive investment alongside necessary humanitarian relief. Food and medical assistance meet needs that cannot wait. Investment in operating businesses, reliable power, and workable trade helps households earn income and the state finance services. We need to expand that investment, not reduce essential relief and hope the economy fills the gap.

Choose an operational port, a group of paying electricity customers, and a first cohort of viable businesses ready to reopen. Establish the costs, responsibilities, and tests for each. Then measure duties reaching the treasury, reliable power delivered at a competitive price, and jobs sustained after assistance ends. That would give Haiti more than another statement of its needs. It would begin building the means to pay for them.

Sources and context

Source material for the historical fiscal inputs and business proposals includes the June 2026 fiscal analysis and the Working Group readout published June 26, 2026. The revenue scenarios above are calculated from the stated GDP and tax-rate inputs. Proposed pilots, financing arrangements, and verification steps are the author's recommendations, not descriptions of funded programs or consensus endorsements. Historical inputs and interview estimates require updating before investment decisions.